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Executive Summary
Even in the era of globalization, several countries in 
Africa continue to face chronic and persistent food 
insecurity. Malawi is one such country. Following a 
weather shock in 2001, Malawi suffered severe food 
crises during 2001/02 and again during 2003/04. 
The main causes of these crises were both natural 
and manmade. Although poor rainfall resulted in 
low agricultural productivity, inefficient govern­
ment policies exacerbated the crises. The reduction 
in per capita food availability due to low produc­
tion led to a dramatic increase in food prices. The 
rapid increase in prices, combined with low pur­
chasing power of a large section of the Malawian 
population, adversely affected household food 
access. The government's erroneous food price 
policies added to the crises, thwarting the efficient 
functioning of food markets and resulting in 
starvation-related deaths in some districts.
Maize is the dominant food crop in Malawi, and its 
yield is highly sensitive to weather variations. 
Several programs and policies have attempted to 
increase the productivity of maize and help con­
sumers gain better access to food. Yet misguided 
policies and their inconsistent implementation 
remain a major impediment to achieving food 
security for all Malawians. This case study illustrates 
this proposition with two policy examples. The first 
example shows that although Malawi's Starter Pack 
Program—free distribution of hybrid maize seeds 
and fertilizers in small packs to smallholder 
farmers—initially improved food security, pre­
mature scaling down of the program to a targeted 
program during the low-rainfall period of 2001/02 
resulted in food crisis. The second example shows 
how government intervention to subsidize maize 
prices through parastatal outlets kept maize prices 
artificially low. This action led to poor incentives 
for private traders to import food during the 
periods of food deficit and thereby contributed to 
the food crisis.
Several policy responses can address production 
and market failures and help in avoiding future 
food crises. These responses include developing 
small-scale irrigation systems, increasing smallholder 
access to modern inputs, and improving market 
infrastructure and trade. Social safety nets to
smooth consumption shocks and provide income 
opportunities during crisis periods are also impor­
tant. Consistent and well-informed policies can help 
reduce the impact of future food crises. The chal­
lenge to Malawian policy makers is to design, 
sequence, and implement such policies and pro­
grams.
Your assignment is to develop a set of policy 




Malawi is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. 
It is bordered by Mozambique to the east, south, 
and southwest, the Republic of Tanzania to the 
north, and Zambia to the west. It ranks among the 
world's least-developed economies. With a popula­
tion of 12 million, it has one of the highest popula­
tion densities in Africa—128 people per square 
kilometer. The majority of the population [85 
percent] lives in rural areas. The northern region is 
the least-developed part of the country and is less 
densely populated. The central region is home to 
40 percent of the population and is the location of 
the capital city, Lilongwe. This region includes 
many commercial tobacco estates and has some of 
the country's most fertile and productive land. The 
southern region is the most densely populated, 
with about 47 percent of the total population 
[IFAD 2007], Lake Malawi covers one-third of the 
surface of the country with freshwater.
Agriculture
The economy of Malawi is predominantly agricul­
tural. Agriculture accounts for about two-fifth of 
gross domestic product (GDP) and four-fifths of 
export revenues. Agricultural production in Malawi 
depends mainly on seasonal rainfall. The northern 
region has abundant rainfall, whereas the southern 
region is prone to drought. Although all of the 
country's 27 districts have access to a body of 
water, less than I percent of all cultivated land is 
under irrigation. More than 98 percent of rural
Malawians are semi-subsistence farmers. About 2.5 
to 3 million smallholder farmers cultivate about 
2.4 million hectares under customary land tenure.l 
Maize is the principal food crop, but smallholder 
farmers also cultivate other cash crops such as 
burley tobacco and groundnuts. During good har­
vest years, Malawian farmers are able to produce 
2.3 million metric tons of maize, which is important 
for achieving food security. Tobacco is the main 
export commodity and accounts for more than half 
of export revenues [IFAD 2007; World Bank 
2006],
Food fnsecuritv  in  M alaw i
Malawi continues to suffer from chronic and per­
sistent food insecurity. With recurrent droughts 
and floods, food policy management becomes criti­
cal to prevent food crisis. Typically, unfavorable 
weather conditions combined with low input use 
(due either to low fertilizer availability in the mar­
ket or to its high prices) result in low crop yields, 
which aggregate to food deficits at the national 
level. Given that food production depends on uni- 
modal rainfall—that is, a single rainy season in a 
year—food prices fluctuate according to the availa­
bility of food in the market. Because most of the 
rural Malawians who own and cultivate small pieces 
of land are net buyers of food, seasonal variability 
in food prices affects their access to food at the 
household level.
Without appropriate government interventions, 
these households live in a vicious cycle of food 
insecurity and poverty: Low food production 
resulting from low input use leads to low income 
and low food entitlements. Low income further 
results in low investment in productivity-enhancing 
inputs in the next season. Several policies and pro­
grams have attempted to break this vicious cycle. 
Yet policies that are ill conceived and poorly
1 There are two main land tenure systems in Southern 
Africa— customary and statutory tenure. In customary 
tenure, access to land is governed by community mem­
bership and controlled by the chief o f a village. House­
holds have exclusive rights to cultivate the land, but 
because land is jointly owned by the community, it can­
not be used as collateral for loans. In contrast, under the 
statutory tenure system, the owner has exclusive rights 
to the land, which guarantees land tenure security 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
2003).
implemented can do more harm than good for the 
poor.
W hat M akes Food Insecurity in M alaw i 
Persistent?
The following example typifies the plight of the 
majority of the rural households who are caught in 
the vicious cycle described. About 50 percent of 
smallholder farmers in Malawi cultivate less than 
one hectare of land. In a normal season, a farmer 
cultivating one hectare of maize will plant in 
October/November immediately after the first 
major rainfall. Maize is grown for the next five to 
six months and harvested in April/May.
In normal years maize yields depend on the tech­
nology used by farmers. A farmer growing local 
maize varieties without using fertilizer will on aver­
age harvest 8 00-900  kilograms (kg) of grains per 
hectare. This harvest can rise to 1,200 kg per hec­
tare if adequate chemical fertilizers are applied on 
time. A farmer growing improved varieties of seeds 
with chemical fertilizers could obtain a yield up to 
2,000 kg per hectare. Thus, in normal years with 
adequate rainfall, farmers using modern inputs 
could double their food production.
Several factors make this ideal production scenario 
less likely. First, availability of land for food pro­
duction is an increasingly limiting factor under the 
customary land system. Because of increasing popu­
lation density, land availability for individual house­
holds is shrinking over the years. The second 
factor is the weather shocks during the crop 
season. If rainfall at the beginning of the season is 
delayed or inadequate in quantity, farmers will 
delay the planting of maize. Late planting reduces 
yield considerably. Furthermore, even if rainfall is 
adequate at the beginning of the season, low or 
erratic rainfall during the crop season can reduce 
crop yields. The months of February and March 
are particularly critical. If rains fail in this period, 
yield reductions are certain. Third, inadequate use 
of chemical fertilizers and lack of improved varieties 
of seeds can result in low yields even in years of 
normal rainfall. Smallholders' low purchasing power 
prevents them from investing in improved tech­
nologies, particularly when the cost of chemical 
fertilizers is high. Fourth, low labor availability at 
the household level can result in a low level of 
planting and neglect of the planted crops. Because 
food availability is low for poor households during
the crop season, they look for casual work outside, 
even at the cost of neglecting their own farms. In 
addition, chronic illness resulting from malaria and 
HIV/AIDS can reduce labor supply. Finally, a com­
bination of these factors can seriously affect food 
production at the household level.
How does an average Malawian farm household 
with two adults and four children cultivating one 
hectare of land perform in terms of food security? 
With average food production of 900 kg per hec­
tare and a household food requirement of about 
90 kg per month, a typical smallholder household 
will have harvested food for only the next 10 
months. Given the household's immediate cash 
needs, it will sell about half of this food production 
in the market at the prevailing low prices right 
after harvest. This leaves the household with food 
for the next four to five months. By the beginning 
of the next crop season, this household would 
likely have run out of stored food. Their survival 
for the next six months depends on the availability 
of casual employment in rural areas. Along with 
employment availability, the wage levels and pre­
vailing levels of food prices will affect their access 
to food and hence their food security.
Add to this vulnerability the frequent weather 
shocks that reduce food production. Over the past 
20 years six major weather failures have pushed 
Malawi toward food crises. Government policy 
responses have consisted of declaring a food emer­
gency and asking donors for help with food aid. 
But such simple responses have evolved with 
changing pressures from aid agencies regarding 
market and price policies. Often, these policies have 
been ill conceived and poorly implemented. Policy 
inconsistencies often exacerbate the effects of 
weather failures, resulting in persistent food in­
security among a large segment of the Malawian 
population.
Events Lending to Recent Food Crises 
(2001/02 d nd 2002/03)
An immediate cause of the recent food crises in 
Malawi was a decline in food supply resulting from
failed rains during the 2001/02 crop season. In 
February 2002 the Malawi government declared a 
national food crisis and sought donor assistance. 
The food crisis made around 3.5 million Malawians 
(30 percent of the population] vulnerable to 
hunger and starvation (Cromwell and Kyegombe 
2005],
Food security in Malawi depends on the interaction 
of a complex set of factors. Food availability 
depends on maize output and the efficient func­
tioning of food markets. Food access depends on 
the purchasing power of consumers. Thus, it is 
important to look carefully at the trends in pro­
duction levels and food prices to understand the 
food security challenges facing Malawi.
A  vailability o f food. Malawian agriculture depends 
largely on a unimodal rainfall pattern. Malawi's high 
dependence on rainfed agriculture and its low agri­
cultural productivity make its households vulnera­
ble to frequent weather shocks.
Figure 1 traces national production of maize from 
1991 to 2005. For the 2005/06 year, Malawi 
required 2.1 million metric tons of maize to ensure 
food security for its population, which includes 2 
million metric tons of maize for food use and the 
rest for feed and other purposes (GOM 2005], 
Although overall maize production shows an 
increasing trend, per capita maize production has 
been declining since the 1970s (Wobst et al. 2004], 
During the 2001/02 food crisis, maize production 
fell dramatically, but it was still 6 percent above the 
10-year average (Devereux and Tiba 2006], The 
decline in per capita food availability is not just a 
result of low maize production. Population density 
doubled from 59 to 112 people per square kilometer 
between 1977 and 1998, while the per capita availa­
bility of cropped area declined by half, from 0.42 
to 0.23 hectares, leading to an overall decline in 
per capita food availability (Devereux 2006], Agri­
cultural productivity remained low owing to lack of 
intensification. High prices and inadequate availa­
bility during the crop season impede fertilizer use 
for a majority of smallholder farmers.
Figure 1: Trends in Maize Production, 1991-2005
Year
Source: FAO 2006.
Trends in fertilizer prices. Fertilizer prices have 
been increasing over the past 15 years [Figure 2], 
Before the mid-1990s, most smallholders obtained 
fertilizers and hybrid seeds through credit-in-kind 
programs from the Smallholder Agricultural Credit 
Association [SACA], The Agricultural Development 
and Marketing Corporation [ADMARC], the main 
agricultural marketing parastatal, also sold fertilizer 
at a subsidized price. The Government of Malawi 
phased out fertilizer subsidies, however, as part of 
its structural adjustment program. Since mid-1990s 
smallholder farmers have faced open-market fer­
tilizer prices [Devereux 2006], Access to fertilizer 
has declined owing to price hikes, and as a result 
fertilizer use is considerably lower for poorer 
households than for other households [Hoddinott 
2004]. The government's policy response has 
focused on increasing smallholder farmers' access
to chemical fertilizers, but inconsistent imple­
mentation of such policies has kept Malawian 
households in persistent food insecurity.
Access to  food: Trend in maize prices. Both the 
level and variability of food prices determine food 
access. In Malawi, food prices exhibit a high level of 
seasonality. Prices are low during the harvest period 
[May and June], then increase steadily, and reach 
their highest levels during the crop season [January 
to March], Extreme levels of food price fluctua­
tions can trigger a food crisis. For example, during 
the recent crises, food prices rose to their highest 
levels between October 2001 and January 2002. 
Private trade and public interventions failed to 
stabilize food supplies and prices, resulting in high 
levels of food insecurity [FEWSNET 2002].
Figure 2: Fertilizer Price Trends in Malawi, 1990-2003
Source: Phiri 2005, cited in Devereux 2006.
Figure 3 shows the trend of maize prices for 
selected local markets over the period January 2001 
to July 2002. Maize prices rose to reach unprece­
dented levels during the preharvest period in 
February and March 2002, when they averaged 
five to six times higher than their 2001 levels. In 
almost all the areas, prices began to increase in July 
2001 and peaked in February 2002. By May 2002, 
however, all regions had registered rapid declines in 
maize prices, with the prices stabilizing at MK 10-15 
per kg. Yet this level was two to three times higher 
than normal prices. Such persistent high prices 
increased the vulnerability of poorer households 
and resulted in a high level of food insecurity.
In summary, low and erratic rainfall coupled with 
reductions in fertilizer use led to a deterioration in
agricultural productivity in Malawi during 2001/02. 
This decline in productivity in turn reduced market 
food supplies. The reduced food availability caused 
food prices to rise substantially, leading to food 
crisis. Poorer households were unable to buy food 
in the market. Owing to their reduced income, 
even the better-off households were unable to hire 
labor. Lower wage rates resulting from surplus 
labor supply was an additional source of vulnera­
bility for poorer households during this period.
To what extent was low fertilizer use and high 
volatility in food prices a result of poorly designed 
government policies?
Figure J: Local Maize Market Prices in Selected Markets, January 200t-July 2002
month and year
Source: FEWSNET 2002.
Policy Issues and Challenges: Two 
Illustrations of Policy Inconsistency
To illustrate how policy inconsistencies can result 
in persistent food insecurity, this section briefly 
reviews two key policy interventions by the 
Government of Malawi.
Policy toward Increased Access to Modem 
Agricultural Inputs
Low use of modern technology, such as improved 
varieties of seeds and chemical fertilizers, results in 
low crop productivity in Malawi. Soil fertility has 
been depleted over years owing to monocropping 
of maize with little application of chemical fer­
tilizers. To increase the productivity of smallholder
agriculture, the Government of Malawi has distri­
buted chemical fertilizers and improved varieties of 
crop seeds after every major food crisis. The 
Starter Pack Program was initiated in 1998 to pro­
vide farmers with free packets of improved seeds 
and fertilizers for one-tenth of a hectare. It is esti­
mated that the program covered 2.8 million small­
holders, with the objective of increasing domestic 
maize production to 280,000-420,000 metric 
tons a year [Harrigan 2005], Such a result would 
circumvent the need for maize imports from 
neighboring countries and improve the country's 
strategic grain reserve situation. The government 
funded this program with the support of donors as
an income-increasing strategy to break the vicious 
cycle of food insecurity and as a mechanism to 
avoid high-cost food aid programs [Levy 2005],
The Starter Pack Program added 100-150 kg of 
maize at the farm level, delayed the households' 
running out of food by one to two months, 
reduced the market demand for maize during the 
hungry season, and mitigated seasonal price fluctu­
ations [Levy 2003],
In 2000, based on donor criticism that this blanket 
approach to provision of inputs was unsustainable 
and detrimental to private sector development in 
input markets, the government reduced the Starter 
Pack Program to a Targeted Inputs Program [TIP], 
This policy shift eroded the food security benefits 
of the original Starter Pack Program. Devereux 
[2006) reports that in 2001 the additional maize 
production from TIP was only 3 -4  percent—a sub­
stantial reduction from the 16 percent contribution 
of the Starter Pack Program in 1999.
Both the Starter Pack Program and the Targeted 
Inputs Program faced implementation challenges 
such as delays in procurement and distribution of 
inputs, low quality of inputs, and poor support 
from the extension system. The reduced maize 
production by smallholders in 2001 and 2002 
owing to the policy shift, along with these other 
factors, is often cited as a reason for the food crisis 
of 2001/02.
The evolution of the Starter Pack Program in 
Malawi since 1998 and its subsequent scaling down 
reflect substantial policy inconsistency on the part 
of the government. Although these subsidies and 
handouts have been very popular among recipients, 
several weaknesses render this blanket approach 
ineffective. First, government intervention in ferti­
lizer markets and frequent changes in policies and 
institutional set-ups has created uncertainty that 
discourages private traders from entering the 
market and thus restricted the development of a 
competitive fertilizer sector. Second, delays in the 
procurement of inputs have led to late fertilizer 
application and thus contributed to yield shortfalls.
Market-Based Interventions to Achieve 
Food Security
Historically, the Government of Malawi has used a 
highly interventionist approach to achieve food
security. ADMARC, the agricultural parastatal, was 
established in 1971 to help smallholder farmers gain 
access to agricultural inputs and to provide them 
with market outlets for selling and buying 
agricultural outputs. Its well-established network of 
outlets throughout the country helped to procure 
smallholder crops and sell food commodities at 
pan-territorial prices. Until early 1990s, when 
ADMARC came under scrutiny of donors, it 
operated at a loss while remaining a major impedi­
ment for private sector development in the agricul­
tural sector [World Bank 2003). As part of 
Malawi's structural adjustment program in the mid- 
1990s, ADMARC was asked to operate as a busi­
ness entity, which led to the closure of non-profit- 
making outlets, particularly in remote areas. This 
policy contributed to higher fluctuations in food 
availability and food prices, making remote house­
holds vulnerable. Although several programs were 
put in place to encourage private sector develop­
ment, inconsistent policies have kept private trader 
participation in input and output markets grossly 
inadequate. Poor policy signals to the few private 
traders during the periods of food deficits have 
tended to trigger food crisis [FAO 2005).
Rubey [2004] illustrates how the Government of 
Malawi, by continually using ADMARC to inter­
vene in food markets, often with good intentions, 
creates disincentives for private sector traders. 
After a poor harvest in May 2001, the Govern­
ment of Malawi anticipated high levels of food 
insecurity and decided to sell maize through 
ADMARC. By fixing the price of maize at 17 
MK/kg [the prevailing market price in September 
2001), however, it quickly ran out of its maize 
stock. The low supply of maize in the market due 
to the poor harvest pushed the maize price higher 
than ADMARC price, up to 45 MK/kg in some 
markets. At the same time ADMARC continued to 
sell at low prices to those who were in the market 
to buy food. Market prices remained higher than 
the ADMARC price throughout the hungry season 
[October 2001—April 2002). The ADMARC price 
was also low compared with market prices for 
maize in neighboring countries. This price structure 
and the high presence of ADMARC discouraged 
the private sector from engaging in local maize 
markets. Keeping the maize price artificially low 
compared with market prices encouraged some 
private traders to export maize to surrounding 
countries, further adding to local food shortages. 
ADMARC's inability to import the needed
quantities of maize in time added to the food 
shortage, resulting in substantial price increases in 
maize. In short, government intervention in maize 
markets in a sudden and unpredictable way kept 
the private sector out of market.
In contrast, although maize production declined 
again in the following year, the food shortage was 
manageable for several reasons. The government 
did not alter the maize price of 17 MK/kg, which it 
fixed in September 2001. Because the maize price at 
ADMARC markets was higher than local market 
prices, private traders were able to import maize 
from neighboring countries, sell at a lower price, 
and still make a profit. In addition, the government 
and aid agencies made information on their imports 
of maize public. As a result of these factors, maize 
prices fluctuated little during the lean periods of 
food availability [Figure 4],
In summary, the government policy interventions 
during the 2001/02 food crisis showed that poli­
cies that create uncertainty about government
intentions can throw the markets out of balance 
and result in huge price increases affecting a large 
segment of the population. A significant increase in 
food prices can affect the vulnerable section of the 
population, whose purchasing power is already low. 
The Malawi example also demonstrates that incon­
sistent policies can result in a food crisis. Gradual, 
predictable, and transparent management of policy 
options that allow better private trader participa­
tion can reduce the severity of food shortages.
Stakeholders
Preventing future food crises depends on how poli­
cies and programs affect various stakeholders in 
Malawi. An assessment of their roles and influence 
in shaping policies and programs helps in under­
standing the challenges and options in policy 
implementation. The following stakeholders are 
involved in achieving long-term food security in 
Malawi.
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Source: FEWSNET 2004.
Smallholder Farmers
Almost all of Malawi's rural population is engaged 
in smallholder agriculture. Their role in increasing 
agricultural productivity and rural incomes will 
determine the poverty and food security outcomes 
of rural Malawians. Although they are the primary 
stakeholders of policies and programs aimed at 
improving rural welfare, their capacity to organize 
themselves is low. They have very little say in poli­
cies that affect them, although smallholder farmer 
associations are beginning to be organized. This 
group of stakeholders remains highly vulnerable to 
production and market failures owing to their low 
asset base and their low capacity in mobilizing 
individual and community resources.
National Policy Makers in the Government
Responsible for agricultural development, poverty 
reduction, and food security, national policy 
makers have a crucial role in preventing food crises. 
They can exacerbate a crisis if their organizational 
capacity to respond to food-related emergencies is 
weak. Although they are answerable to the Parlia­
ment on the impact of their decisions, the connec­
tion between legislative and administrative branches 
of government is still weak in Malawi. National-level 
policy makers are motivated by the long-term goal 
of achieving food security for all Malawians, yet 
they are not well connected to the problems at the 
grassroots level.
Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation (A DM ARC)
ADMARC has been a key player in Malawi's food 
and agriculture sector. With its field offices located 
all over the country, ADMARC has extensive out­
reach to the farming community. ADMARC con­
tinues to be the arm of government that intervenes 
in food markets. It has, however, come under criti­
cism by development partners for its inefficiency 
and its role in the poor development of private 
traders in agricultural markets. In Malawi, where 
entrepreneurship and institutional credit facilities 
are limited, ADMARC is likely to play a major role 
in agricultural markets.
Private Traders
Private traders in input and output markets have a 
large role to play in the agricultural development 
of Malawi. Not well organized, the private sector in
Malawi continues to be at the mercy of govern­
ment policies for its survival. Although the opening 
up of grain markets to private trade in the mid- 
1990s helped many entrepreneurs enter the food 
market, poor development of infrastructure, low 
credit availability, and lack of market information 
prevented this group from playing an increased 
role in addressing food problems through markets. 
This group of stakeholders has shown increasing 
presence lately through cross-border trade of food 
commodities.
Development Partners
Development partners continue to play a key role 
in preventing food crisis in Malawi. As advisers on 
and financiers of development plans and policies, 
they have a high level of influence over the 
government's decisions. Yet government policies 
often go beyond donor recommendations. Because 
of their commitment to the long-term food 
security of the people of Malawi, donors are highly 
active in food security discussions. They are also 
free to experiment and intervene in the rural areas 
directly through the large presence of NGOs and 
civil society organizations. Development partners 
have been important for Malawi in its efforts to 
prevent famine-like conditions through food aid 
and distribution.
NGOs and Civil Society Organizations
The number of NGOs and civil society organiza­
tions in Malawi has been increasing for the past 
decade. Because of their presence throughout the 
country and their proximity to media representa­
tives, they are often able to bring the plight of 
rural communities to the attention of public 
authorities and development partners. Largely 
funded by development partners, they have the 
freedom to experiment with new ideas to solve 
food security problems, yet their solutions focus 
on the specific needs of the local community they 
serve. They continue to play a critical role in 
shaping Malawi's poverty reduction strategy 
through their representatives, who participate in 
the debates and discussions at the district and 
national levels.
Policy Options
Short-term policy measures alone cannot achieve 
food security for all. They need to be placed in the
context of long-term development strategies. For 
example, in 2000 Malawi adopted the goal of 
halving poverty and hunger by 2015 as one of the 
Millennium Development Goals [MDGs], Meeting 
this food security goal for Malawi, where poverty 
has been increasing during the past decade, is, 
however, a major development challenge. Although 
the Government of Malawi has attempted many 
strategies since 2000, including developing a 
poverty reduction strategy to guide policy in the 
medium term, it is important to recognize that 
agriculture will play a crucial role in achieving the 
MDG described. As evident from the preceding 
discussion, erratic weather patterns and high input 
costs lead to food shortages. To succeed in halving 
the proportion of the population suffering from 
hunger, Malawi needs to pursue policy and invest­
ment reforms on multiple fronts. This section 
focuses on three options that could lead to 
improved food security and poverty reduction:
1. increasing agricultural productivity;
2. improving market infrastructure and trade; 
and
3. providing social safety nets for the vulner­
able.
Increasing Agricultural Productivity
Irrigation. Malawi's capacity to irrigate its croplands 
remains grossly underexploited. With only marginal 
investments, Malawi could irrigate a considerable 
area of cropped land using water-lifting systems, 
given that one-third of the country's landmass is 
covered by freshwater. This irrigation could sub­
stantially reduce the variability in food supply 
during drought years. Thus, increasing irrigation of 
croplands and cropping intensity should form a key 
long-term strategy for achieving food security.
Development of irrigation systems is not without 
its challenges. High costs of irrigation development 
and weak institutional capacity to maintain and 
operate such systems remain major challenges. For 
example, the estimated average investment per hec­
tare in Africa ranges from US$2,000 to US$4,000 
for small-scale projects and from US$9,000 to 
US$15,000 for large-scale irrigation projects 
[African Union 2006J.2 These high costs,
2 in India the comparable cost for large-scale projects 
ranges between US$1,500 and US$2,000.
combined with poor credit services, make expan­
sion of smallholder irrigation difficult in Malawi.
Small-scale irrigation systems, however, remain a 
viable strategy for improving agricultural produc­
tivity in Malawi. With application of appropriate 
irrigation technologies, smallholders in Malawi will 
be in a position to increase crop production and 
enhance their own livelihoods.
Soil fe rtility  management. Soil fertility and nutrient 
management influence agricultural productivity, and 
thus food security and livelihoods.
Smallholders' access to chemical fertilizers remains a 
critical issue in increasing soil fertility. Putting in 
place an appropriate institutional framework for 
input and output marketing and service provision 
can improve the accessibility of fertilizers. For 
example, establishing public-private partnerships 
with potential private traders and ADMARC to 
import and sell fertilizers throughout the country 
can increase chemical fertilizer use and its timely 
application.
It is also possible to reduce the cost of fertilizer by 
increasing competition among fertilizer dealers 
through training and credit facilities, particularly in 
the cash crop-growing areas where farmers could 
afford fertilizer.
For smallholders who cannot afford chemical ferti­
lizer, alternative methods of improving soil fertility 
need to be promoted. Integrated nutrient manage­
ment is a proven method that uses balanced and 
efficient use of organic and inorganic plant 
nutrients. Using natural resources such as green 
manures and some chemical fertilizers in various 
combinations can result in long-term build-up of 
soil fertility. Use of this approach will require, 
however, strong institutional support from the 
extension system for educating smallholder 
farmers.
Improving Market Infrastructure and Trade
Although a number of private traders have 
emerged as major players in agricultural markets, 
they have not been able to close the gap created by 
the reduction in the number of ADMARC outlets 
in remote areas. This gap still poses challenges in 
making food accessible at affordable prices to con­
sumers during the lean season and in supplying
agricultural inputs to smallholder farmers. Because 
the private marketing system is not highly competi­
tive, the monopolistic pricing tendencies of these 
private traders affect household food security.
Development of market infrastructure and appro­
priate institutions that facilitate private sector 
involvement could enable better participation of 
new entrepreneurs in food and input markets. 
Reducing policy-related market uncertainty is also 
important. For example, better market information 
on prices, production levels, trade flows, and 
imports can reduce the uncertainties associated 
with the government's pricing policies. A partner­
ship between ADMARC and the private sector to 
facilitate imports and trade flows (within and across 
boundaries) can help if it is carried out in a consist­
ent manner that ensures competition within the 
private sector.
Safety Nets for the Vulnerable
Safety nets can play an important role in protecting 
vulnerable households during periods of food 
crisis. They can also mitigate the effects of short­
term liquidity and production shortfalls. A few 
policy options are relevant for Malawi.
First, the design of safety net programs could be 
aimed at overcoming the impediments to agricul­
tural growth. Public works programs, such as road 
construction or small-scale irrigation provision, can 
provide employment to vulnerable households 
while supplying infrastructure for agricultural 
development.
Second, during food crises, it is important to iden­
tify the ultra poor and devise strategies that benefit 
them. Targeted pure transfers can limit total costs 
to a manageable level and increase the likelihood of 
program sustainability.
Finally, it is important to choose transfer programs 
that have multiplier effects for the entire economy. 
For example, the Starter Pack Program in Malawi 
resulted in substantial yield benefits and improved 
maize production, although the program was not 
sustainable owing to poor targeting mechanisms.
Assignment
Your assignment is to develop a set of policy
recommendations that will prevent future food
crises in Malawi.
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